Selected journal articles
Selected book chapters
- 'Epistemic Worth', in Ergo (forthcoming).
- 'Knowledge, Justification, and (a Sort of) Safe Belief', in Synthese (forthcoming).
- 'Right in Some Respects: Reasons as Evidence', in Philosophical Studies (2018) 175: 2191-2208.
- 'Against Second-Order Reasons', in Noûs (2017) 51: 398-420.
- 'Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance', co-authored with Jonathan Way, in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2017) 20: 361–374.
- 'Reasons and Guidance (or, Surprise Parties and Ice Cream)', co-authored with Jonathan Way, in Analytic Philosophy (2016) 57: 214-235.
- 'If You Justifiably Believe that You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ', co-authored with Jonathan Way, in Philosophical Studies (2016) 173: 1873-1895.
- ‘What is the Normativity of Meaning?’, in Inquiry (2016) 59: 219-238. [Selected for Philosophy Editor's Choice 2015.]
- ‘Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn’, in Erkenntnis (2015) 80: 1245-1253.
- ‘The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony’, in British Journal of Aesthetics (2015) 55: 91-107.
- 'Knowledge is Not Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason’, in Logos and Episteme (2015) 6: 237-243.
- ‘Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori’, in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2014) 8: 1-22. Discussion on PEA Soup blog here.
- ‘Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief’, in Teorema (2013) 13: 121-135. [Invited contribution to The Aim of Belief, special issue, edited by José Zalabardo.]
- ‘Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion’, in Erkenntnis (2013) 78: 847-867.
- ‘It’s Not What You Said, It’s How You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures’, in Analytic Philosophy (2013) 54: 364-377. [Invited contribution to a special issue on pejoratives.]
- ‘The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False)’, in Philosophy (2013) 88: 219-242 [Special Commendation in Royal Institute of Philosophy Essay Prize Competition].
- ‘Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?’, in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2012) 93: 279-300.
- ‘Epistemic Value and Achievement’, in Ratio (2012) 25: 216-230.
- ‘Leave Truth Alone: on Deflationism and Contextualism’, in European Journal of Philosophy (2011) 19: 607-624.
- ‘Spinoza, the “No Shared Attribute” Thesis and the Principle of Sufficient Reason’, in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (2011) 19: 543-548.
- ‘Should I Believe the Truth?’, in dialectica (2010) 64: 213-225.
- ‘Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?’, in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2009) 90: 535-555.
- ‘On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity’, in European Journal of Philosophy (2009) 17: 416-434.
- ‘Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription’, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2008) 38: 575-599.
- ‘Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives’, in Philosophia (2008) 36: 375-388.
- ‘Defending Semantic Generalism’, in Analysis (2007) 67: 303-311.
- ‘The Normativity of Meaning Defended’, in Analysis (2007) 67: 133-140.
- ‘Inferentialism, Representationalism and Derogatory Words’, in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2007) 15: 191-205.
Selected book chapters
- 'Whither Higher-Order Evidence?', in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, ed. M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- 'Don't Take My Word for It: On Beliefs, Affects, Reasons, Values, Rationality, and Aesthetic Testimony', in Art and Belief, ed. H. Bradley, P. Noordhof, and E. Sullivan-Bissett (Oxford University Press, 2017).
- ‘Languages, Language Games, and Forms of Life’, in A Companion to Wittgenstein, ed. H-J. Glock and J. Hyman (Blackwell-Wiley, 2017).
- ‘Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action’, in Epistemic Norms, ed. C. Littlejohn and J. Turri (Oxford University Press, 2014).
- ‘Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief’, in The Aim of Belief, ed. T. Chan (Oxford University Press, 2013).
- ‘Particular and General: Wittgenstein, Linguistic Rules and Context’, in The Later Wittgenstein on Language, ed. D. Whiting (Palgrave, 2010).
- ‘The Normativity of Belief’, co-authored with Conor McHugh, in Analysis (2014) 74: 698-713.
- ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. J. Fieser and B. Dowden (2006; revised 2009).
- Is Star Trek a Star Trek film?’, in The Philosophy of J. J. Abrams, ed. P. Bruce (Kentucky University Press, 2014).
- ‘Is There Such a Thing as a Language?’, in Alice in Wonderland and Philosophy, ed. W. Irwin and R. Davis (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
- ‘Between Old and New: Brandom’s Analytic Pragmatism' [Robert Brandom's Between Saying and Doing (Oxford University Press, 2008], in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2009) 17: 416-434.
- 'Fregean Sense and Anti-Individualism' [Jessica Brown’s Anti-Individualism and Knowledge (MIT Press, 2004)], in Philosophical Books (2007) 48: 233-240.
- ‘Meaning, Norms, and Use' [Donald Davidson’s Truth, Language, and History (Oxford University Press, 2005)], in Philosophical Investigations (2007) 30: 179-187.
- Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 2018), in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (August 29th 2018).
- Allan Hazlett, A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief (Oxford University Press, 2013), in Mind (2016) 499: 918-922,.
- Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity (Oxford University Press, 2012), in European Journal of Philosophy [Reviews Supplement] (2015) 23: 14-18.
- Duncan Pritchard, Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford University Press, 2010), in Philosophical Quarterly (2011) 61: 645-648.
- Simon Blackburn, Practical Tortoise Raising and Other Philosophical Essays (Oxford University Press, 2010), in Times Higher Education (January 6th 2011).
- Anandi Hattiangadi, Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-following and the Normativity of Content (Oxford University Press, 2007), in Philosophical Quarterly (2008) 58: 743-745.
- Martin Kusch, A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke’s Wittgenstein (Acumen, 2006), in Mind (2007) 463: 1132-1136.