I look forward to contributing to a workshop involving researchers in law and philosophy on Responsibility, Knowledge, and Belief on December 14-15 2019 at Senate House in London. The workshop is jointly sponsored by John Hyman's ERC-funded Roots of Responsibility project and Alexander Greenberg’s Leverhulme project, Belief in Philosophy and the Criminal Law, The title of my talk is "Epistemic Worth".
On October 15th 2019, I will give a talk to the Philosophy Department at the University of Glasgow as part of its "Senior Seminar" series. The title is "A Modal Theory of Reasons". Here is the abstract:
A (normative) reason is a consideration that justifies performing some action or having some attitude. For example, that she promised to meet Nishi there is a reason for Miyuki to decide to go to the cinema, that her favourite film is showing is a reason for Miyuki to want to go to the cinema, and that Nishi is punctual is a reason for Miyuki to believe that he will be there before the film starts. But what is it for some consideration to be a reason? Some claim that there is no informative answer to that question. Others try to answer it by appeal to such notions as explanation, evidence, or reasoning. In this paper, I offer a new answer to the question, one which makes central appeal to a modal notion, specifically, the notion of a nearby possibility. After introducing the proposal, I explain its advantages and address objections to it.
On Oct 17th 2019, I will visit the Philosophy Department at the University of Stirling to give a talk. The title is "(Un)Demanding Reasons". Here's an abstract:
Normative reasons are considerations that justify thinking, feeling, and acting. For example, the fact that the riverbank has burst is a reason for Maria to believe that her house will flood, to be worried about her property, and to climb on to the roof. In this paper, I offer new arguments for the view that there are two kinds of reasons - those that (merely) justify and those that (also) demand. More carefully: I argue that there are two kinds of relation in which considerations stand to responses: justifying and demanding. After illustrating the distinction and offering principled ways of drawing it, I show how it solves a problem facing accounts that recognise only one kind of reason, namely, the problem of distinguishing what a person may do, what they ought to do, and what they must do.
On May 21-22, I will participate in a conference on the above theme at the University of Edinburgh. The event, supported by a British Society of Aesthetics Connections grant, is organised by Alex King (SUNY Buffalo) and Dominic McIver Lopes (British Columbia). The *provisional* title of the talk is "Lovers, snobs, and faddists: admiration, appreciation, and higher-order evidence".
I will participate in the New York University - Abu Dhabi workshop on Normativity and Reasoning taking place 13-15 January 2019, I look forward to responding to a presentation by Daniel Wodak.
On Wednesday 5th December 2018, I will present a paper at the Philosophy Club at St Andrews. The title of my talk is "A modal theory of reasons". I look forward to it!
On 23-24 March, I will be speaking at a workshop on Epistemic Normativity at the University of Luxembourg, organised by Frank Hofmann and Christian Piller. The title of my talk is: Justified Belief as (a Sort of) Safe Belief.
On March 30th 2018, I will present a paper to the Philosophy Department at Yale-NUS College in Singapore. The title is "Epistemic Worth".
On 12 April 2018, I will be presenting a paper in a research seminar at the University of Melbourne. The title is 'Epistemic Worth'. I will also be sharing my work with philosophy postgraduates in an informal "pre-seminar". I look forward to the visit!