On Oct 17th 2019, I will visit the Philosophy Department at the University of Stirling to give a talk. The title is "(Un)Demanding Reasons". Here's an abstract:
Abstract Normative reasons are considerations that justify thinking, feeling, and acting. For example, the fact that the riverbank has burst is a reason for Maria to believe that her house will flood, to be worried about her property, and to climb on to the roof. In this paper, I offer new arguments for the view that there are two kinds of reasons - those that (merely) justify and those that (also) demand. More carefully: I argue that there are two kinds of relation in which considerations stand to responses: justifying and demanding. After illustrating the distinction and offering principled ways of drawing it, I show how it solves a problem facing accounts that recognise only one kind of reason, namely, the problem of distinguishing what a person may do, what they ought to do, and what they must do.
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