On November 11th 2020, I will present work (remotely) in an Uppsala Aesthetics Research Seminar. The provisional title of the talk is: Aesthetic Worth.
At the (online) Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society, hosted by Kent, I will be giving a presentation aimed at early career researchers on the topic of: Getting Published: the Whys, the Hows, the Whens. This will take place at 1pm on Sunday 12th of July. More details on the conference website.
CANCELLED DUE TO COVID-19 CRISIS
In the week commencing April 20th 2020, I will visit the Department of Philosophy at the Humboldt University of Berlin. On April 23, I will present work-in-progress at the normativity colloquium. Other plans are in the works...
On 16th September 2020, I will be presenting at a workshop at the University of Leeds on the above theme, organised by Darren Bradley. The title the talk is: The Unity of Normativity Made Safe Again. Due to the Covid-19 crisis, the workshop will take place online.
On 24-26 September 2020, I will be a keynote speaker at a workshop at the University of Vienna on the above theme. The talk will explore connections between epistemic and practical normativity.
UPDATE This event will now take place on-line. The title of my talk will be: Making the Unity of Normativity Safe Again.
CANCELLED DUE TO COVID-19 CRISIS
I have been invited to speak at a workshop in Edinburgh organised by Alix Cohen (Edinburgh) and Andrew Chignell (Princeton) on the theme of epistemic normativity from a Kantian perspective. The provisional dates are June 18-19, The title of my talk is TBC. More details soon.
As part of my AHRC funded project on Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics , I am organising a workshop to take place on September 17th 2019. I will be presenting a paper titled: "Lovers, Snobs, and Faddists: Admiration, Appreciation, and Higher-Order Evidence".
The other speakers will be Elinor Mason (Edinburgh), Zoë Johnson King (NYU), and Benjamin Kiesewetter. For more information, including details of how tor register, visit here.
I look forward to contributing to a workshop involving researchers in law and philosophy on Responsibility, Knowledge, and Belief on December 14-15 2019 at Senate House in London. The workshop is jointly sponsored by John Hyman's ERC-funded Roots of Responsibility project and Alexander Greenberg’s Leverhulme project, Belief in Philosophy and the Criminal Law, The title of my talk is "Epistemic Worth".
On October 15th 2019, I will give a talk to the Philosophy Department at the University of Glasgow as part of its "Senior Seminar" series. The title is "A Modal Theory of Reasons". Here is the abstract:
A (normative) reason is a consideration that justifies performing some action or having some attitude. For example, that she promised to meet Nishi there is a reason for Miyuki to decide to go to the cinema, that her favourite film is showing is a reason for Miyuki to want to go to the cinema, and that Nishi is punctual is a reason for Miyuki to believe that he will be there before the film starts. But what is it for some consideration to be a reason? Some claim that there is no informative answer to that question. Others try to answer it by appeal to such notions as explanation, evidence, or reasoning. In this paper, I offer a new answer to the question, one which makes central appeal to a modal notion, specifically, the notion of a nearby possibility. After introducing the proposal, I explain its advantages and address objections to it.
On Oct 17th 2019, I will visit the Philosophy Department at the University of Stirling to give a talk. The title is "(Un)Demanding Reasons". Here's an abstract:
Normative reasons are considerations that justify thinking, feeling, and acting. For example, the fact that the riverbank has burst is a reason for Maria to believe that her house will flood, to be worried about her property, and to climb on to the roof. In this paper, I offer new arguments for the view that there are two kinds of reasons - those that (merely) justify and those that (also) demand. More carefully: I argue that there are two kinds of relation in which considerations stand to responses: justifying and demanding. After illustrating the distinction and offering principled ways of drawing it, I show how it solves a problem facing accounts that recognise only one kind of reason, namely, the problem of distinguishing what a person may do, what they ought to do, and what they must do.